LEGAL ENTITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN LEGAL FICTION AND ONTOLOGICAL REALITY

Abstract

The article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the problem of legal personality of artificial intelligence (AI) in the modern legal order. The arguments for and against granting AI the status of a legal subject are considered. On the one hand, the increase in the autonomy and cognitive capabilities of AI creates objective grounds for a discussion about the possibility of its participation in legal relations, especially in areas where it already performs delegated functions (medicine, finance, intellectual property). On the other hand, the absence of consciousness, will and the ability to self-perception in AI makes it problematic to consider it as a "rights holder". Any legal consolidation of such a status is currently considered a fiction that can create legal uncertainty, complicate the system of responsibility and even undermine trust in the law.

International practice is analyzed, in particular cases of granting legal status to rivers and animals that had a specific ecological and humanistic basis. It is shown that such examples cannot be automatically transferred to the field of AI, since it is devoid of its own interests or internal experience. At the same time, the article substantiates the prospects of the concept of limited digital personhood, which provides for granting AI only special and functional rights and obligations depending on the level of autonomy, degree of risk and nature of the functions performed. Such an approach allows ensuring legal certainty and proportionality of regulation without creating illusory subjects of law.

Particular attention is paid to the human-centric dimension of the problem. It is emphasized that the primary task of legal regulation is to protect human rights and freedoms in the context of the growing influence of AI. The relevance of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, which enshrines the human-centric AI approach, is emphasized. The author concludes that the discussion about “robot rights» should remain a subject of the future, while today the priority is to form effective mechanisms of responsibility and guarantees of human-centric use of technologies.