PECULIARITIES OF COERCION AS A SOCIALLY DANGEROUS ACT

Abstract

The article deals with coercion as a cross-cutting criminal concept. The legality of law enforcement depends on its correct and unified understanding. The purpose of the article is to identify the features of socially dangerous acts as one of the features of the criminal concept of coercion. The main tasks of the analysis are to answer the following questions: in what specific acts can coercion be expressed; whether coercion can be expressed only by action or also by inaction; and compulsion and the actual method of coercion are identical concepts. Coercion implies a requirement to act in a certain way or, conversely, not to act. That is, the content of the behaviour that the offender expects from the addressee must be voiced or otherwise communicated to him. Therefore, coercion as a requirement is an act of communication and therefore involves active behaviour. Coercion as a requirement must be supported by certain means that can influence the victim's free will, namely, to force him to act or not act accordingly. The role of such protective means in coercion serves as a sign of the crime. The Criminal Code (CC) of Ukraine defines the following methods of coercion of a person: threat; causing real harm; with the use of official position or by a person on whom the victim was financially or otherwise dependent; other illegal actions; and without detailing the method of coercion in the norm. Mental methods of coercion can be varied. The main thing is that such techniques are capable of influencing the individual's free will. The public danger of coercion lies not so much in the way it is coerced, but in coercion itself as the requirement for a person to act or not to act accordingly. Therefore, it is advisable to exclude from the relevant criminal law indications of coercion, and indications of specific methods of coercion. This unjustifiably narrows the scope of the criminal legal protection of an individual's freedom of will in the relevant area. It is proved that coercion as an informational influence involves the demand of the perpetrator to the victim (always an action); the influence on the freedom of expression is